The central focus of this paper is on the relationship between domestic market structure and export performance. It evaluates the hypothesis that more concentrated industrial sectors can achieve more easily the transition from standardized, labor-intensive manufactures to sophisticated, skillintensive products, as such industries are better able to cope with the inevitable reputational externalities involved in producing high-quality goods for foreign markets. South Korea and Taiwan provide a good test of the theory, as they have sharply different market structures. The results of the empirical analysis provide strong support for the hypothesis.
I. Introduction
For developing countries, probably the predominant question of strategic trade policy is: how can entry be facilitated into markets for sophisticated manufactured goods characterized by imperfect competition and well-entrenched oligopolists? Pessimism regarding the prospects for successful entry into such markets underlies the widespread unease with outward-oriented trade strategies. Yet, as the experiences of Japan and the East Asian tigers folllowing on her heels have amply demonstrated, successful entrants can always create room for themselves. These countries have diversified into manufactured products of increasing sophistication, demonstrating that even the tightest international oligopolies can be shook up.
The broad reasons underlying the export success of the East Asian countries are now well known. My focus in this paper is on a narrow, but significant aspect of their performance: the transition from standardized, labor-intensive manufactures to sophisticated, skill-intensive products where quality plays an important role. While traditional factor-endowment considerations typically play the determinant role with the former group of products, the role of industrial organization comes intb its own with the latter. Putting it somewhat crudely, the transition can be viewed as a shift form price to quality as the source of competitiveness. The higher-end products typically require not only a broader range of skills and -2-technological sophistication, but also investment in product quality, customer loyalty, and reputation.
The rate at which the transition takes place, if it does take place at all, is naturally influenced by a wide range of factors and country characteristics. Can industrial policy play a role here as well? As a first cut, I focus in this paper on broad patterns of industrial organization. We can identify two relevant models for policy here. In the first, policy would favor the formation of large firms and conglomerates and direct resources towards them, discriminating against small firms and potential entrants. In the second, policy would be neutral and a more fluid, diffuse industrial structure would result. Which is the more conducive pattern for making the transition to high-end products? In the next section, I will discuss a simple theory which suggests that the transition can be achieved more easily when domestic industry is highly concentrated. The basic argument is that such industries are better able to cope with the inevitable reputational externalities involved in producing high-quality goods for foreign markets. Given this difference, it would be very surprising indeed if their respective trade patterns did not reflect it somehow. In light of the considerations discussed above, this paper looks for evidence of differential performance with respect to product quality. I find strong support for the hypothesis that industrial organization and product quality are related in the expected manner: the quality of Korean manufactured exports--with quality proxied by unit value--is systematically higher than that of Taiwanese exports.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section sketches out a simple theory which relates product quality to the number and size distribution of firms in an exporting industry. Section III compares briefly the industrial organization patterns in South Korea and Taiwan, and discusses some of the reasons behind the differences. Analyzing the two, countries' exports to the U.S., section IV presents evidence on their divergent performance with respect to product quality. The paper ends with concluding comments in section V.
II. Product quality and Industrial qryanization: A Theoretical Sketch
New entrants into high-end product categories typically face an entry barrier altogether different from the usual obstacles. Perceived product quality is an important component of demand for such products; to be Judged high-quality by consumers, entrants must invest in reputation or other means of communicating quality. The problem is even more serious for firms from developing countries, as they may have to surmount a reputation for shoddy quality frequently associated with developing-country goods.1 -4-Such informational barriers to entry have been the subject of a number of theoretical papers. In the simplest framework, one could imagine that (foreign) consumers' familiarity with quality increases with cumulated exposure to the product in question. Provided the actual quality level of home exports exceeds the perceived level, there may then be a role for export subsidies to speed up the process of product familiarization (Mayer. 1984).
When domestic firms are differentiated by quality, high-end firms can try to signal quality by selling at low prices initially (in anticipation of future profits); subsidies can facilitate such signalling strategies, at an overall welfare gains to the home economy (Bagwell and Staiger, 1986) . But the problem is that subsidies may also encourage additional domestic firms to enter at the low-end of the quality spectrum, failing to improve the perceived quality of home exports, and increasing the cost to high-quality producers of distinguishing themselves from their low-quality counterparts (Grossman and Horn, 1987) . In all these cases, the transition to higher-quality products is hampered by informational entry barriers.
These papers do not consider directly the importance of domestic market structure in determining the average level of product quality in exports. A recent article by Chiang and Masson (1988), motivated specifically by policy discussions in Taiwan, focuses on this issue in the context of a simple model of reputational externalities in product quality. Their basic point is that concentrated industries will do a better job of internalizing these, and that they will therefore tend to produce at the higher end of the quality spectrum.
In what follows, I will base my argument on the same point, and sketch out a similar model with a few additional twists.
Consider an industry which is a price-taker in world markets and which exports all of its output. Since my objective is to trace the effects of industry structure on product quality, I will take as given the overall size of the industry and the size distribution of firms within it. This is tantamount to assuming fixed capacities and full capacity utilization. (1) 4
where is (for now) taken to be fixed. As a firm's perceived quality level (and hence price) will be based partly on other exporters' quality choices, this formulation introduces the externality which drives this section's results. The average quality level is simply
where s is firm j's (fixed) share in industry output.
Letting x denote the firm's (fixed) level of output, profits can be written as
,r -which yields the first-order condition for quality:
Notice that the social optimum would require the reputational externality to be eliminated by setting equal to in which case the equilibrium level of would be unity, irrespective of the firm's market share. As can be seen from (4), this case can be recovered in this framework when #-l, i.e. when firms can costlessly and perfectly communicate their individual quality levels to foreign consumers. Notice that denotes the weight attached to ownquality level in foreigners' perceptions. As long as 4rCl, quality involves a positive externality, and firms' quality level will lie below unity. In the worst possible scenario, when firms are branded by the average quality level of the home industry (-O), will equal the firm's share in the industry.
In general, larger firms will choose higher levels of quality.
We can now investigate the effects of industry structure on average product quality. Suppose that is identical across firms. In the present framework, average quality then turns out to be a simple linear function of the Herfindahl index of concentration. Using (2) and (4) in conjunction with 1, we get
where His the Herfindahl index. As q is increasing in H, more concentrated industries will operate at higher quality levels than less concentrated ones. For a given scale of industry output, the Herfindahl index -7-is influenced both by the number of firms and the size distribution of firms, so both factors will come into play in determining q. Notice also that whether a firm operates below or above the industry-wide average will depend on the relationship between its market share and H:
Therefore, > q whenever s > H. 
The first-order condition for remains unchanged from (4)--except that is no longer a constant. With respect to (9) x'(q -q)
Notice that for firms that operate at or below average quality (q -q S 0)
this equality requires that A > 0, implying --0. For low-end firms, it simply does not pay to communicate their true quality levels, as this hampers their free ride on higher-quality firms, As (9) shows, firms that choose to invest in "reputation" will be those
with sufficiently high quality relative to the average.2 From our earlier discussion, these will be the firms with larger market shares. For such firms A -0, and we have
Since 'b' ' is negative by assumption, high levels of will be associated with high levels of fj.
To determine the effect on the average level of quality in the industry, let us divide firms into two groups, one for which f -0, and the other for which I > 0. 
where H is once again the Herfindahl index. If firms were unable to 2. What "sufficiently" means in this context depends on the magnitude of '(0). The larger is '(0) the smaller is the threshold above q for investing in reputation.
-9-distinguish themselves from their competitors would equal H (as (O) -0).
As (11) shows, the ability to communicate their true quality--as partial and costly it may be--raises the average quality level of exports.
The bottom-line of this discussion is that, everything else being the same, we would expect more concentrated industries to produce and export a higher quality range of products. When firms have the ability to build reputation and brand loyalty, the expectation is that the quality differential between concentrated and unconcentrated industries will be even larger: this is because the incentive to undertake such investments depends on how skewed the size distribution of firms (and hence the quality distribution) is in the first place.
To be sure, the model presented here is no more than a parable. It Scitovsky takes it on faith that more competitive industries will perform better. But he is forced to conclude: "Ironically [sic), in Korea there is no evidence that the large profits and fast accumulation of great fortunes that Korea's economic policies made possible had any unfavorable effects on the drive, stamina, and efficiency of Korea's businesses." He concludes, in what would easily give cultural explanations a bad name, by saying "[p]erhaps this is due to the Chinese cultural background" (1986, p. 151).
-11-firms to break into high-technology markets, at least when investment requirements are no too large. Direct, comparative evidence on industrial organization patterns in the two countries is hard to come by. Table 1 Given the transactions cost of dealing with governmental bureaucracies, it is also likely that the more active role of the Korean government in industry (in credit allocation, for example) would have served to discriminate against small and medium firms, even when policy had no such objective (see Levy, 1986) . taking some license with terminology, it can be said that "industrial policy" favored industrial consolidation in Korea and was indifferent to firm size in Taiwan. IV. Evidence on Product quality from US, ImDorts I now turn to discuss the available evidence on product quality in Korean and Taiwanese exports. Note first that by most relevant criteria, Taiwan is the more developed of the two from an economic perspective (see Table 2 ).
Most important from our perspective, Taiwan is comparatively rich in human skills and education by virtue of having been an early-starter compared to
Korea. As Table 2 shows, Korea now appears to have caught up with Taiwan in terms of £iQ additions to the educated workforce, but the latter country is still endowed with a proportionately larger stock of skilled and educated workers. On these grounds, then, we would expect Taiwan to be further along the transition to high-end products than Korea. The industrial-organization effects discussed above go in the opposite direction.
To check for systematic differences in product-quality, I examine the unit values for the two countries' exports to the United States, disaggregated at an appropriate level. A critical maintained hypothesis is that unit values are a good proxy for quality. For manufactured exports of the type that will be the focus of the analysis, this seems to be a sensible working hypothesis.5
The analysis is restricted to the U.S. market in order to obtain closelycomparable trade data for the two countries. The U.S. is by far the largest export market for both countries, accounting for roughly a half of total 5.
I have also computed unit values for Japanese exports to the U.S. These are almost without exception higher than those for the two countries. This is consistent with what we know regarding Japan's successful transition to products at the very high end of the quality spectrum. In order to focus on products which are important exports for the two countries, I restrict the analysis to categories in which at least one of the countries had exports to the U.S. exceeding $100 million.
In 1986, there were forty-nine such product groups. Exports included in these groups amount to $9.6 billion for Korea and $14.5 billion for Taiwan. a substantial part of each country's total exports to the U.S. Table 3 lists the respective unit values for each of these forty-nine 6. For example, the highly detailed seven-digit TSUSA classification contains categories such as: "moccasins, soled, leather, for women, not over $2.50 pair" (emphasis added).
7.
The description further adds, helpfully: "In the case of transactions between related parties, the relationship between buyer and seller should not influence the Customs value." with a z-value of 2,75. Notice that this is a particularly stringent test of our hypothesis, as a priori we would expect Taiwanese products to be of higher quality than Korean ones on all grounds but industrial organization.
A related implication of the model is that Korean exporters would be more likely to specialize at the high-end of the quality spectrum across broad product categories, as they possess a comparative advantage there relative to Taiwan. Figure 1 shows that this is indeed the case. Ranking product groups by Japanese unit values to establish a rough quality hierarchy, we find that market nay lead to high transfer prices being set on these exports, Drovided that it is viewed preferable to hold income in South Korea rather than in the U.S. In any case, the hypothesis that quality differentials in the exports of the two countries are systematically related to their industrial organization patterns would appear to be worth closer look.
V. Conc1udin Remarks
This paper has combined a simple--perhaps simplistic--theory with a simple test. The findings are two-fold: (1) Korean exports tend to be systematically of higher quality relative to Taiwanese exports, at least when quality is proxied by unit value; and (ii) this is consistent with a model of quality choice in which reputational externalities are less damaging in heavily concentrated industries.
A crucial final point concerns the normative aspect of the analysis.
Nothing that has been said here should be construed as advocacy of an industrial policy that actively pursues concentration. Before we can go from the positive analysis to policy prescription, we will need a more complete 9. Based on a quick look at 1975, it would appear that earlier years show the same pattern as that of 1986. Among included categories, the Korean premium In that year ranges from 20.1 percent (Taiwanese export weights) to 30.9 percent (Korean export weights). a Excludes enterprises/establishments with less than S employees.
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